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SCHOLARSHIP AND FELLOWSHIP GRANTS AS
INCOME: A SEARCH FOR TREASURY POLICY
DONALD H. GORDONt
More than five. years have elapsed since the enactment of section
117 as a part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1 In that period
there have been several revenue rulings2 and one judicial decision3
dealing with problems arising under section 117. A reading of these
suggests that the difficulties which characterized the income tax
treatment of grants and awards in aid of student and scholar prior
to the enactment of the section still remain. It is the thesis of what
follows that this need not be so, that a broader reading of section 117
is justified and appropriate, and that a clarification of Treasury policy
can eliminate further uncertainty in this sector of the income tax law.
I. PRIOR LAW AND THE PRESENT STATUTORY TREATMENT
In the years prior to 1954 the cases and rulings framed the issue
of whether a scholarship or fellowship grant4 need be included in
t Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan.
1. 68A Stat. (1954).
2. Rev. Rul. 554, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 36 (amount of exclusion); Rev. Rul. 101,
1956-1 Cum. Bull. 89 (Education Exchange Act grant); Rev. Rul. 419, 1956-2
Cum. Bull. 112 (foundation grant to Ph.D. candidate); Rev. Rul. 50, 1957-1 Cum.
Bull. 74 (Rockefeller Public Service award); Rev. Rul. 127, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 275
(government grant for research made through a university); Rev. Rul. 131,
1957-1 Cum. Bull. 75 (grant to foreign exchange student); Rev. Rul. 370, 1957-2
Cum. Bull. 105 (U. S. Public Health Service grant); Rev. Rul. 385, 1957-2 Cum.
Bull. 109 (grant for administrative residency in a hospital) ; Rev. Rul. 386, 1957-2
Cum. Bull. 107 (internship grant in a hospital) ; Rev. Rul. 484, 1957-2 Cum. Bull.
113 (institutional training in employer's school); Rev. Rul. 522, 1957-2 Cum. Bull.
50 (grant to theology students); Rev. Rul. 560, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 108 (Mayo
Foundation Fellowships); Rev. Rul. 76, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 56 (American Heart
Association Research Fellowship); Rev. Rul. 179, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 57 (National
Institute of Health grant); Rev. Rul. 222, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 54 (sabbatical leave
grant); Rev. Rul. 322, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 59 (Air University Research award);
Rev. Rul. 338, 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 54 (award to student nurse); Rev. Rul. 403,
1958-2 Cum. Bull. 49 (U. S. Navy educational assistance grant); Rev. Rul. 498,
1958-2 Cum. Bull. 47 (National Science Foundation grant for summer institute
for high school and college science teachers) ; Rev. Rul. 59-81, 1959 Int. Rev. Bull.
No. 11, at 10 (travel grant to teacher); Rev. Rul. 59-118, 1959 Int. Rev. Bull. No.
15, at 8 (Veterans' Administration grant to Ph.D. candidate); Rev. Rul. 59-191,
1959 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 22, at 10 (scholarship award by corporation).
3. Wrobleski v. Bingler, 161 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
4. Scholarships and fellowships will be referred to as grants unless specifically
distinguished.
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the recipient's gross income in these terms: Is the grant, upon the
facts of each case, more properly classifiable as a "gift" or as "com-
pensation"? A resolution in favor of "gift" meant the recipient might
exclude the payment from gross income, whereas a decision that "com-
pensation" was the appropriate characterization led to inclusion. The
difficulty with this kind of classification as applied to scholarships and
fellowships lies in the fact that in many cases elements of both gift
and compensation are present.
Thus, if one examines I.T. 4056,c which deals with four separate
grants for scientific and literary work, the admixture referred to
becomes apparent. The grantor in each received no benefit, indeed it
did not even require that the recipients report progress.7 This is
hardly typical of an employment relationship. On the other hand,
each recipient was a professional in his field and was engaged, during
the period of the grant, in the practice of his profession. The amounts
were paid, if not on the condition that the skills of the recipient would
be applied, at least in the expectation that this would be so. And
although they were paid without assurance that the goals of the
recipient would be achieved, it was a legitimate belief that these
goals would at least be approached. To this extent the grants resemble
compensation/, Moreover, as to the benefits obtained by the recipients,
these too resemble compensation. The recipient labors and is paid.
The conclusion of the I.T. is that the grants in question are not
excludible as gifts but rather are includible in gross income as com-
pensation.
With this view one can compare the holding of the court in
McDcrnzott . Conmmissioner2. Although this case deals with prizes,"
it in essence involves the same admixture of gift and compensation.
Here taxpayer received the Ross Essay Prize of the American Bar
5. George Winchester Stone, Jr., 23 T.C. 254 (1954); Ti Li Leo, 22 T.C. 220
(1954); Ephraim Banks, 17 T.C. 1386 (1952); Israel Strauss, 16 P-H Tax Ct.
Mere. 729 (1947) ; I.T. 3756, 1945 Cum. Bull. 64.
6. 1951-2 Cur. Bull. 8.
7. Treas. Reg. 1.117-4 (c) (1958) makes it clear that the requirement of prog-
ress reports to the grantor does not of itself "destroy the essential character of
such amount as scholarship or fellowship grant."
8. On the possibility that the grantor might recover the amount paid if the
recipient failed to engage in the proposed activities, see Restatement, Restitution
§ 56(1) (1937). If the grantor was successful in obtaining recovery and was not
a tax exempt institution, would the recovery be includible in gross income? See
Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
9. Compensation is defined as that which compensates; payment; amends. Funk
& Wagnalls, New Standard Dictionary of the English Language (1960).
10. 150 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
11. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 74.
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Association."2 The court held the receipt excludible from gross income.
It noted that although the taxpayer performed services (the writing
of the essay), these services were not rendered to the grantor. It
further observed that the purpose of the payment was not "to buy"
but to "incite,""11 a distinction which would be equally applicable
to the situation in I.T. 4056. Here too the assumption is implicit
that "gift" or "compensation" were the sole alternatives. The diffi-
culty is occasioned by the admixture of both elements in the case. 14
Against this background Congress enacted section 117. The ap-
proach it takes separates the treatment of the recipient of such a
grant who is seeking an academic degree from the treatment of the
recipient who is not. In the case of the former, the problem is dealt
with almost exclusively as one involving the presence or absence of
teaching activity or other services performed by the recipient. Thus
section 117(b) (1) states:
In the case of an individual who is a candidate for a degree at an
educational institution (as defined in section 151 (e) (4) ), sub-
section (a) shall not apply to that portion of any amount received
which represents payment for teaching, research, or other ser-
vices in the nature of part-time employment required as a con-
dition to receiving the scholarship or the fellowship grant. If
teaching, research, or other services are required of all candidates
(whether or not recipients of scholarships or fellowship grants)
for a particular degree as a condition to receiving such degree,
such teaching, research, or other services shall not be regarded
as part-time employment within the meaning of this paragraph.
12. The Ross Essay Prize was established by the late Judge Erskine 1. Ross
who, in his will, left $100,000 to the ABA for the purpose of awarding a prize
from the income of the fund "for the best discussion of a subject to be by it sug-
gested for discussion at its preceding annual meeting." McDermott v. Commis-
sioner, supra note 10, at 585. See Soll, Essay Competitions and Income Tax
Contests, 6 Tax L. Rev. 109 (1950).
13. This distinction lies at the bottom of the entire controversy. Its emphasis
is, however, on the purpose of the payor. If one shifts his inquiry to the payee,
the payor's motivation becomes less meaningful.
14. Chommie, Federal Income Taxation: Transactions in Aid of Education, 58
Dick. L. Rev. 93, 189, 291 (1954); Kelly, Taxation of Fellowships and Scholar-
ships, 3 Duke B.J. 69 (1952); Loring, Some Tax Problems of Students and Schol-
ars, 45 Calif. L. Rev. 153 (1957); Note, Fellowship Grants Under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 286 (1959); Note, Nature of Awards to
Faculty Members from Funds Donated to University for Such Purposes: Gifts or
Compensation for Services?, 43 Cornell L.Q. 510 (1958); Note, Scholarships, Fel-
lowships and Prizes: Gift or Income?, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 152 (1953); Note, Fellow-
ships and Scholarships, Prizes and Awards--Ante 1954, Post 1954, 7 Syracuse L.
Rev. 130 (1955).
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And in the House Report there is this statement:
When the scholarships and fellowships are granted subject to the
performance of teaching or research semces, the exclusion is
not to apply to that portion which represents payments which
are in effect a wage or salary.
On the other hand, in the case of the recipient who is not a candidate
for academic degree no such reference to the presence or absence of
services is made.', It is of interest to note with respect to the last
cited provision that it differs from the original version as proposed
by the House." In the House Bill such grants were to be excluded
only if the yearly receipt thereunder together with any payments
received from the taxpayer's previous employer totalled less than
751, of the taxpayer's salary in the prior year. The House Report28
indicates that this percentage-of-prior-compensation test was intended
to show "whether the grant is in effect a salary payment"
It is apparent that the House version was not based so much on
the view that the activity of the recipient was thought to constitute
consideration for the grant as that the activity of the recipient in
enjoying the grant is substantially the same as that by which he earns
his living ordinarily, i.e., study and research. This is substantiated
by the House Report"' which says that the exclusion should not apply
to "individuals who are not candidates for degrees [as to] amounts
received as grants which in effect represent a continuing salary
during a period while the recipient is on leave from his regular job."
One can see by comparing this with the final version"O that sub-
15. H.R. Rep. No. 1837, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1954).
16. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 117 (b) (2).
17. H.R. Rep. No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1954).
18. Supra note 15.
9. ibid.
20. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 117 (b) (2):
Individuals who are not candidates for degrees.-In the case of an indi-
viduaI who is not a candidate for a degree at an educational institution
(as defined in section 151(c) (4)), subsection (a) shall apply only if the
condition in subparagraph (A) is satisfied and then only within the limi-
tations provided in subparagraph (B).
(A) Conditions for Exclusion.-The grantor of the scholarship or fellow-
ship grant is an organization described in section 501(c) (3) which is
exempt from tax under section 501 (a), the United States, or an instru-
mentality or agency thereof, or a State, a Territory, or a possession of
the United States, or any political subdivision thereof, or the Dist ict of
Columbia.
(B) Extent of Exclusion.-The amount of the scholarship or fellowship
grant excluded under subsection (a) (1) in any taxable year shall be
limited to an amount equal to $300 times the number of months for
which the recipient received amounts under the scholarship or fellowship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1960/iss2/2
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stantial modification took place in the Senate. It was the Senate's
view that a percentage-of-former-compensation test was unworkable
because it might render includible in gross income grants which
were not in the nature of compensation. 21 Thus, the Senate substituted
a time and dollar limitation and a requirement that the grantor
be a religious, scientific, charitable or educational organization or a
federal or state agency. It is clear from the Senate Report that the
effect of this modification was not the mere substitution of one kind
of quantitative limitation for another.22 Because the House version23
was not an attempt to limit an exclusion, but rather was designed to
distinguish between those grants to the non-degree-seeking recipient
which should be excluded from those which should not, the Senate
approach should be read with the same effect.
It should be noted that these portions of section 117 are sections
of limitation on the more sweeping language of section 117 (a) (1). -4
And it is this subsection which one might have expected to resolve
the basic issue: What kinds of payments are to be excluded? How-
ever, as can be seen, we are told that only "scholarships" and "fellow-
ships" grants are to be excluded. We are not told what these may be.
And it was clear from prior law, at least prior to 1954, that not all
grant during such taxable year, except that no exclusion shall be allowed
under subsection (a) after the recipient has been entitled to exclude
under this section for a period of 36 months (whether or not consecu-
tive) amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship grant while not a
candidate for a degree at an educational institution (as defined in section
151 (e) (4)).
21. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954).
22. The Senate Report, supra note 21, contains this language: "Cases were
brought to your committee's attention in which the formula of the House bill
would tax grants which were clearly not a continuing salary payment.... Your
committee therefore has substituted for the 75 percent rule an exclusion of $300
per month of grants paid to individuals who are not candidates for degrees."
23. Supra note 15.
24. (a) General Rule.-In the case of an individual, gross income does not
include-
(1) any amount received-
(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in
section 151 (e) (4)), or
(B) as a fellowship grant,
including the value of contributed services and accommodations; and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for-
(A) travel,
(B) research,
(C) clerical help, or
(D) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but
only to the extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.
Washington University Open Scholarship
SCHOLARSHIP AND FELLOWSHIP GRANTS
payments so labeled would qualify.- Thus, it is only in the subsections
of limitation that intrinsic definitional evidence is found.
What significance can be given the distinction drawn by the
Congress between recipients who seek academic degrees and those
who do not? It has been suggested that such a distinction is justified
on the basis that the person who is already qualified to practice his
trade or profession is, in taking further training or in engaging in re-
search, to be compared with the doctor or lawyer who acquires in-
creased competence through his daily practice.26 For this reason such
a person should not receive tax preference. The individual who is en-
gaged in acquiring the necessary training to begin his life's work, on
the other hand, should be so entitled. But section 117 gives special ad-
vantage to both classes, the variation in treatment turning only on a
limitation of the advantage in the case of the professional.
Thus the distinction between the two seems to be based on empirical
considerations. As to the degree-seeking recipient the ordinary re-
quirements of curriculum and the presumed desire of such persons to
qualify as soon as possible would of themselves tend to limit receipt of
tax advantage to a reasonable time. Whereas, in the case of the pro-
fessional, embarked on a lifetime of such work, such a built-in brake is
absent. As to him a time and dollar limitation is, therefore, necessary.
And, in addition, there must be some reference to the character of the
grantor to eliminate commercial arrangements.2Y
When we move from the section to the Regulation- additional aid is
given with regard to the definitional problem. Although the Regula-
tion begins with a definition of scholarship and fellowship grant which
is in accord with general usage, ',* it soon departs therefrom in its state-
25. Stipra note 5.
26. Huberman, Scholarships, Fellowships and Prizes, 3 Hastings L.J. 116
(1952).
27. § 117(b) (2), supra note 20.
28. Tieas. Reg. § 1.117 (1958).
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3 (1958) provides:
Definitions. (a) Scholarship. A scholarship generally means an amount
paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of, a student, whether an under-
graduate or a graduate, to aid such individual in pursuing his studies.
The term includes the value of contributed services and accommodations,
... and the amount of tuition, matriculation, and other fees which are
furnished or remitted to a student to aid him in pursuing his studies.
The term also includes any amount received in the nature of a family
allowance as a part of a scholarship. However, the term does not include
any amount provided by an individual to aid a relative, friend, or other
individual in pursuing his studies where the grantor is motivated by
family or philanthropic consideration. If an educational institution
maintains or participates in a plan whereby the tuition of a child of a
faculty member of such institution is remitted by any other participating
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1960/iss2/2
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ment of what scholarships and fellowships are not. Thus the Regula-
tion states that among payments not excluded from gross income are:
(c) Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for
the benefit of the grantor.
(1) Except as provided in § 1.117-2 (a), any amount paid or al-
lowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue
studies or research, if such amount represents either compensa-
tion for past, present, or future employment services or repre-
sents payment for services which are subject to the direction or
supervision of the grantor.30
Thus it appears that the section as read by the Treasury still in-
volves the underlying question: Is the payment compensation? And
indeed the problems which have arisen since 1954 support this obser-
vation. For example, an employee of the National Institute of Health
received a grant from the Institute for foreign travel and study. Al-
though he was not required to return to his employment at the end of
the period of the grant he intended to do so. The Treasury ruled that
the grant qualified under 117.31 On the other hand, an amount paid a
professor by his employer to aid him in pursuing his research interests
during a sabbatical year's leave was held not to qualify for exclusion
under the section. The latter grant was thought, on the contrary, to
constitute continuing compensation although the employer was not
obliged to make this payment.32
In another case,33 the stipend paid medical interns was held to con-
stitute compensation, although internship is a necessary part of the
prospective medical practitioner's training. By contrast, in Wrobleski
v. Bingler,34 a stipend paid to a doctor engaged in graduate psychiatric
training who as part of that training also treated patients was held to
qualify for exclusion.
educational institution attended by such a child, the amount of the tui-
tion so remitted shall be considered to be an amount received as a schol-
arship.
(c) Fellowship grant. A fellowship grant generally means an amount
paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of, an individual to aid him in the
pursuit of study or research. The term includes the value of contributed
services and accommodations (see paragraph (d) of this section) and the
amount of tuition, matriculation, and other fees which are furnished or
remitted to an individual to aid him in the pursuit of study or research.
The term also includes any amount received in the nature of a family
allowance as a part of a fellowship grant. However, the term does not
include any amount provided by an individual to aid a relative, friend, or
other individual in the pursuit of study or research where the grantor is
motivated by family or philanthropic consideration.
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (c) (1) (1958).
31. Rev. Rul. 179, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 57.
32. Rev. Rul. 222, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 54.
33. Rev. Rul. 386, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 107.
34. 161 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
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If one compares these examples with the cases under pre-1954 law-,
one sees that there has been little change of focus. Indeed, it may be
said that the value of section 117 lies not in providing a solution to the
problem but rather in its recognition that scholarships and fellowships
are sufficiently unique in terms of their social function and in the
framework in which they are employed to merit treatment separate
from that accorded gifts and compensation. But by the same token,
the weakness of the application of the section by the Treasury thus far
lies in the fact that the meaning of this uniqueness has not been suffi-
ciently recognized and articulated.
II. THE ROLE OF SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS AND ITS
RELEVANCE TO TREASURY POLICY
Certain observations must be made in order to locate ourselves in
the area of gross income generally. The inclusiveness of the word "in-
come" has been extended to its Constitutional limits2 6 Thus it is no
longer necessary, if it was so once, to characterize the receipt of a
scholarship or fellowship as compensation in order to include it in
gross income. When such diverse items as the receipts of an extor-
tionist, -1 findings,-' punitive damages'- and insiders' profits-10 are in-
cludible in the term "income" there is little reason, absent Congres-
sional fiat, to exclude scholarships and fellowships. On the other hand,
the more pervasive the concept of "income" becomes, the greater the
strain on words of exclusion, such as "gift." Thus, it would appear
that the establishment of a separate section of exclusion for scholar-
ships and fellowships has as one of its functions the removal of part of
the strain placed on the other sections of exclusion. But this function
can be realized only if the determination of what is meant by scholar-
ship and fellowship does not depend on a reference to such terms as
"gift" on one hand, or "compensation" on the other.
In order to avoid such a reference, however, one must distinguish
the characteristics of scholarship and fellowship grants from the char-
acteristics of gift so that a separation of the treatment of such grants
becomes meaningful. The same differentiation becomes important as
between scholarships and fellowships and compensation. Without sug-
gesting that the following is exhaustive, or is more than opinion, a
number of points of reference are hereinafter set out in order to make
35. Supra note 5.
36. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
37. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1953).
38. Rev. Rul. 61, 1953-1 Cure. Bull. 17; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (a) (1959).
39. Supra note 36.
40. General Am. Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434 (1955).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1960/iss2/2
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Association.12 The court held the receipt excludible from gross income.
It noted that although the taxpayer performed services (the writing
of the essay), these services were not rendered to the grantor. It
further observed that the purpose of the payment was not "to buy"
but to "incite,"' 3 a distinction which would be equally applicable
to the situation in LT. 4056. Here too the assumption is implicit
that "gift" or "compensation" were the sole alternatives. The diffi-
culty is occasioned by the admixture of both elements in the case.14
Against this background Congress enacted section 117. The ap-
proach it takes separates the treatment of the recipient of such a
grant who is seeking an academic degree from the treatment of the
recipient who is not. In the case of the former, the problem is dealt
with almost exclusively as one involving the presence or absence of
teaching activity or other services performed by the recipient. Thus
section 117(b) (1) states:
In the case of an individual who is a candidate for a degree at an
educational institution (as defined in section 151 (e) (4)), sub-
section (a) shall not apply to that portion of any amount received
which represents payment for teaching, research, or other ser-
vices in the nature of part-time employment required as a con-
dition to receiving the scholarship or the fellowship grant. If
teaching, research, or other services are required of all candidates
(whether or not recipients of scholarships or fellowship grants)
for a particular degree as a condition to receiving such degree,
such teaching, research, or other services shall not be regarded
as part-time employment within the meaning of this paragraph.
12. The Ross Essay Prize was established by the late Judge Erskine M. Ross
who, in his will, left $100,000 to the ABA for the purpose of awarding a prize
from the income of the fund "for the best discussion of a subject to be by it sug-
gested for discussion at its preceding annual meeting." McDermott v. Commis-
sioner, supra note 10, at 585. See Soil, Essay Competitions and Income Tax
Contests, 6 Tax L. Rev. 109 (1950).
13. This distinction lies at the bottom of the entire controversy. Its emphasis
is, however, on the purpose of the payor. If one shifts his inquiry to the payee,
the payor's motivation becomes less meaningful.
14. Chommie, Federal Income Taxation: Transactions in Aid of Education, 58
Dick. L. Rev. 93, 189, 291 (1954); Kelly, Taxation of Fellowships and Scholar-
ships, 3 Duke B.J. 69 (1952); Loring, Some Tax Problems of Students and Schol-
ars, 45 Calif. L. Rev. 153 (1957); Note, Fellowship Grants Under the Internal
Revenue Code, of 1954, 8 Buffalo L. Rev. 286 (1959) ; Note, Nature of Awards to
Faculty Members from Funds Donated to University for Such Purposes: Gifts or
Compensation for Services?, 43 Cornell L.Q. 510 (1958); Note, Scholarships, Fel-
lowships and Prizes: Gift or Income?, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 152 (1953) ; Note, Fellow-
ships and Scholarships, Prizes and Awards--Ante 1954, Post 1954, 7 Syracuse L.
Rev. 130 (1955).
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And in the House Report I  there is this statement:
When the scholarships and fellowships are granted subject to the
performance of teaching or research services, the exclusion is
not to apply to that portion which represents payments which
are in effect a wage or salary.
On the other hand, in the case of the recipient who is not a candidate
for academic degree no such reference to the presence or absence of
services is made.- It is of interest to note with respect to the last
cited provision that it differs from the original version as proposed
by the House." In the House Bill such grants were to be excluded
only if the yearly receipt thereunder together with any payments
received from the taxpayer's previous employer totalled less than
75% of the taxpayer's salary in the prior year. The House Report18
indicates that this percentage-of-prior-compensation test was intended
to show "whether the grant is in effect a salary payment."
It is apparent that the House version was not based so much on
the view that the activity of the recipient was thought to constitute
consideration for the grant as that the activity of the recipient in
enjoying the grant is substantially the same as that by which he earns
his living ordinarily, i.e., study and research. This is substantiated
by the House Report" which says that the exclusion should not apply
to "individuals who are not candidates for degrees [as to] amounts
received as grants which in effect represent a continuing salary
during a period while the recipient is on leave from his regular job."
One can see by comparing this with the final version" that sub-
15. H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1954).
16. 1nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 117(b) (2).
17. H.R. Rep. No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1954).
18 Supra note 15.
19. Ibid.
20. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 117 (b) (2):
Individuals who are not candidates for degrees.-In the case of an indi-
vidual who is not a candidate for a degree at an educational institution
(as defined in section 151(c) (4)), subsection (a) shall apply only if the
condition in subparagraph (A) is satisfied and then only within the limi-
tations provided in subparagraph (B).
(A) Conditions for Exclusion.-The grantor of the scholarship or fellow-
ship grant is an organization described in section 501(c) (3) which is
exempt from tax under section 501(a), the United States, or an instru-
mentality or agency thereof, or a State, a Territory, or a possession of
the United States, or any political subdivision thereof, or the District of
Columbia.
(B) Extent of Exclusion.-The amount of the scholarship or fellowship
grant excluded under subsection (a) (1) in any taxable year shall be
limited to an amount equal to $300 times the number of months for
which the recipient received amounts under the scholarship or fellowship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1960/iss2/2
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stantial modification took place in the Senate. It was the Senate's
view that a percentage-of-former-compensation test was unworkable
because it might render includible in gross income grants which
were not in the nature of compensation.21 Thus, the Senate substituted
a time and dollar limitation and a requirement that the grantor
be a religious, scientific, charitable or educational organization or a
federal or state agency. It is clear from the Senate Report that the
effect of this modification was not the mere substitution of one kind
of quantitative limitation for another.2 2 Because the House version23
was not an attempt to limit an exclusion, but rather was designed to
distinguish between those grants to the non-degree-seeking recipient
which should be excluded from those which should not, the Senate
approach should be read with the same effect.
It should be noted that these portions of section 117 are sections
of limitation on the more sweeping language of section 117 (a) (1).24
And it is this subsection which one might have expected to resolve
the basic issue: What kinds of payments are to be excluded? How-
ever, as can be seen, we are told that only "scholarships" and "fellow-
ships" grants are to be excluded. We are not told what these may be.
And it was clear from prior law, at least prior to 1954, that not all
grant during such taxable year, except that no exclusion shall be allowed
under subsection (a) after the recipient has been entitled to exclude
under this section for a period of 36 months (whether or not consecu-
tive) amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship grant while not a
candidate for a degree at an educational institution (as defined in section
151 (e) (4)).
21. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1954).
22. The Senate Report, supra note 21, contains this language: "Cases were
brought to your committee's attention in which the formula of the House bill
would tax grants which were clearly not a continuing salary payment .... Your
committee therefore has substituted for the 75 percent rule an exclusion of $300
per month of grants paid to individuals who are not candidates for degrees."
23. Supra note 15.
24. (a) General Rule.-In the case of an individual, gross income does not
include-
(1) any amount received-
(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in
section 151(e) (4)), or
(B) as a fellowship grant,
including the value of contributed services and accommodations; and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for-
(A) travel,
(B) research,
(C) clerical help, or
(D) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant, but
only to the extent that the amount is so expended by the recipient.
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payments so labeled would qualify.7 Thus, it is only in the subsections
of limitation that intrinsic definitional evidence is found.
What significance can be given the distinction drawn by the
Congress between recipients who seek academic degrees and those
who do not? It has been suggested that such a distinction is justified
on the basis that the person who is already qualified to practice his
trade or profession is, in taking further training or in engaging in re-
search, to be compared with the doctor or lawyer who acquires in-
creased competence through his daily practice.2 r For this reason such
a person should not receive tax preference. The individual who is en-
gaged in acquiring the necessary training to begin his life's work, on
the other hand, should be so entitled. But section 117 gives special ad-
vantage to both classes, the variation in treatment turning only on a
limitation of the advantage in the case of the professional.
Thus the distinction between the two seems to be based on empirical
considerations. As to the degree-seeking recipient the ordinary re-
quirements of curriculum and the presumed desire of such persons to
qualify as soon as possible would of themselves tend to limit receipt of
tax advantage to a reasonable time. Whereas, in the case of the pro-
fessional, embarked on a lifetime of such work, such a built-in brake is
absent. As to him a time and dollar limitation is, therefore, necessary.
And, in addition, there must be some reference to the character of the
grantor to eliminate commercial arrangements.27
When we move from the section to the Regulation2s additional aid is
given with regard to the definitional problem. Although the Regula-
tion begins with a definition of scholarship and fellowship grant which
is in accord with general usage, 5 it soon departs therefrom in its state-
25. Supra note 5.
26. Huberman, Scholarships, Fellowships and Prizes, 3 Hastings L.J. 116
(1952).
27. § 117(b) (2), supra note 20.
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.117 (1958).
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3 (1958) provides:
Definitions. (a) Scholarship. A scholarship generally means an amount
paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of, a student, whether an under-
graduate or a graduate, to aid such individual in pursuing his studies.
The term includes the value of contributed services and accommodations,
... and the amount of tuition, matriculation, and other fees which are
furnished or remitted to a student to aid him in pursuing his studies.
The term also includes any amount received in the nature of a family
allowance as a part of a scholarship. However, the term does not include
any amount provided by an individual to aid a relative, friend, or other
individual in pursuing his studies where the grantor is motivated by
family or philanthropic consideration. If an educational institution
maintains or participates in a plan whereby the tuition of a child of a
faculty member of such institution is remitted by any other participating
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ment of what scholarships and fellowships are not. Thus the Regula-
tion states that among payments not excluded from gross income are:
(c) Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for
the benefit of the grantor.
(1) Except as provided in § 1.117-2 (a), any amount paid or al-
lowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue
studies or research, if such amount represents either compensa-
tion for past, present, or future employment services or repre-
sents payment for services which are subject to the direction or
supervision of the grantor.30
Thus it appears that the section as read by the Treasury still in-
volves the underlying question: Is the payment compensation? And
indeed the problems which have arisen since 1954 support this obser-
vation. For example, an employee of the National Institute of Health
received a grant from the Institute for foreign travel and study. Al-
though he was not required to return to his employment at the end of
the period of the grant he intended to do so. The Treasury ruled that
the grant qualified under 117.3 1 On the other hand, an amount paid a
professor by his employer to aid him in pursuing his research interests
during a sabbatical year's leave was held not to qualify for exclusion
under the section. The latter grant was thought, on the contrary, to
constitute continuing compensation although the employer was not
obliged to make this payment.32
In another case,33 the stipend paid medical interns was held to con-
stitute compensation, although internship is a necessary part of the
prospective medical practitioner's training. By contrast, in Wrobleski
v. Bingler,3 4 a stipend paid to a doctor engaged in graduate psychiatric
training who as part of that training also treated patients was held to
qualify for exclusion.
educational institution attended by such a child, the amount of the tui-
tion so remitted shall be considered to be an amount received as a schol-
arship.
(c) Fellowship grant. A fellowship grant generally means an amount
paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of, an individual to aid him in the
pursuit of study or research. The term includes the value of contributed
services and accommodations (see paragraph (d) of this section) and the
amount of tuition, matriculation, and other fees which are furnished or
remitted to an individual to aid him in the pursuit of study or research.
The term also includes any amount received in the nature of a family
allowance as a part of a fellowship grant. However, the term does not
include any amount provided by an individual to aid a relative, friend, or
other individual in the pursuit of study or research where the grantor is
motivated by family or philanthropic consideration.
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (c) (1) (1958).
31. Rev. Rul. 179, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 57.
32. Rev. Rul. 222, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 54.
33. Rev. Rul. 386, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 107.
34. 161 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
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If one compares these examples with the cases under pre-1954 law35
one sees that there has been little change of focus. Indeed, it may be
said that the value of section 117 lies not in providing a solution to the
problem but rather in its recognition that scholarships and fellowships
are sufficiently unique in terms of their social function and in the
framework in which they are employed to merit treatment separate
from that accorded gifts and compensation. But by the same token,
the weakness of the application of the section by the Treasury thus far
lies in the fact that the meaning of this uniqueness has not been suffi-
ciently recognized and articulated.
II. THE ROLE OF SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS AND ITS
RELEVANCE TO TREASURY POLICY
Certain observations must be made in order to locate ourselves in
the area of gross income generally. The inclusiveness of the word "in-
come" has been extended to its Constitutional limits.- Thus it is no
longer necessary, if it was so once, to characterize the receipt of a
scholarship or fellowship as compensation in order to include it in
gross income. When such diverse items as the receipts of an extor-
tionist, 11 findings38 punitive damages" and insiders' profits" are in-
cludible in the term "income" there is little reason, absent Congres-
sional fiat, to exclude scholarships and fellowships. On the other hand,
the more pervasive the concept of "income" becomes, the greater the
strain on words of exclusion, such as "gift." Thus, it would appear
that the establishment of a separate section of exclusion for scholar-
ships and fellowships has as one of its functions the removal of part of
the strain placed on the other sections of exclusion. But this function
can be realized only if the determination of what is meant by scholar-
ship and fellowship does not depend on a reference to such terms as
"gift" on one hand, or "compensation" on the other.
In order to avoid such a reference, however, one must distinguish
the characteristics of scholarship and fellowship grants from the char-
acteristics of gift so that a separation of the treatment of such grants
becomes meaningful. The same differentiation becomes important as
between scholarships and fellowships and compensation. Without sug-
gesting that the following is exhaustive, or is more than opinion, a
number of points of reference are hereinafter set out in order to make
35. Supra note 5.
36. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
37. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1953).
38. Rev. Rul. 61, 1953-1 Cum. Bull. 17; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (a) (1959).
39. Supra note 36.
40. General Am. Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434 (1955).
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the comparisons above referred to. It is intended that this analysis
will point out the means for developing a more successful interpretive
role for the Treasury in this area.
The following points may be helpful:
1. What are the similarities and dissimilarities with respect to
motivation which are characteristic of employers, grantors and
donors?4 1
By and large one would expect that employers are motivated
primarily by economic self-interest. Grantors, on the other hand,
must be considered as intending by their payment to benefit so-
ciety at large. When one considers donors (except as regards
gifts to charitable organizations) the range of motivations is
probably less susceptible to reasonable generalization; however,
one hazards that gifts are generally motivated by affection, appre-
ciation or concern for those related by ties of kinship or friend-
ship. Thus on this point of comparison it seems clear that com-
pensation, grant and gift are essentially unlike.
2. What is the nature of the relationship between employer and
employee, grantor and student or scholar, donor and donee and
are these relationships similar in character?
The employment relationship is typically that of strangers who
bargain at arms length either individually or through a collective
structure and in which the payor is in a position to direct the ac-
tivity of the payee. Although grantor and scholar also are stran-
gers, the latter is not directed in his activity by the former. On
the other hand, the relationship of donor and donee is that of
friend or relative. Moreover no activity is contemplated in return
for or is stimulated by the payment. Here, therefore, also there
is ground for considering compensation, grant and gift essentially
unlike.
3. What economic functions are most directly served by compen-
sation, grant and gift, and are these functions similar?
The economic function of an employment relationship is pre-
sumably the direct production of wealth whether in the form of
goods or services or both. As to grants: insofar as increase in
knowledge or competency is the expected result of study or re-
search the primary effect of payments in this category is not the
41. For the purpose of what follows, the three relationships under discussion
and the payments which arise because of them are described as follows:
a. Employer-Employee--Compensation
b. Grantor-Grantee-Grants
c. Donor-Donee-Gifts
Relationship "a" is the familiar one wherein Employer hires Employee and pays
him for his labor. Relationship "b" is that with which section 117 deals: grantor
directly or indirectly provides funds to finance the education of student-grantee or
the research of scholar-grantee. Relationship "c" is descriptive of the broad area
of gratuitous payment in cash or property made to payees because of the affection
or concern of the payor. As will be seen in the text, I have excluded charitable
contributions from "c" for the purpose of discussion.
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production of economic wealth, although ultimately such study
and research may at some later time provide the stimulus or
wherewithal for the production of economic wealth. And in some
cases even the end product of such payments may be aesthetic
pleasure rather than economic wealth. A gift, on the other hand,
is primarily a distribution of wealth rather than a production of
the same. Here too, therefore, essential dissimilarities are noted.
4. Do employers, grantors and donors exhibit similar character-
istics in regard to economic status, family status, and individual
or corporate identity?
Whereas the economic status of employers runs from one end to
the other of the economic spectrum, particularly if one regards
the stockholders of large corporate enterprises as the ultimate
employers, one would expect that grantors and donors tend to fall
at the upper end of the spectrum. It is impossible to contrast the
family status of non-corporate employers and grantors, whereas
donors will tend to be parents or spouses. Again employers and
grantors cannot be distinguished as to corporate or individual
identity, whereas donors are individuals. Thus here the distinc-
tion between employer and grantor is blurred while donors stand
apart from the other two.
5. Are the characteristics of employees, grantees, and donees sim-
ilar in respect to economic status, family status and individual or
corporate identity?
The economic and family status of employee and grantee can-
not be differentiated; whereas, again, donees are probably most
often children or spouses. All three are similar with respect to in-
dividual rather than corporate identity. No substantial distinc-
tions can be drawn.
6. Are the relationships between the payment and the need of the
recipient similar or dissimilar as to compensation, grant and gift?
Insofar as the direction to hire and the rate of pay are mostly
determined on the basis of general economic conditions, one could
assume the need of the employee is significant only as it makes
itself felt in the shaping of the market. On the other hand, the
need of the potential recipient is directly related to the decision
to make grants and gifts and to the size of them in a significant
number of situations, although in the case of gifts this may be
less true than it is of grants to students and scholars.
7. Are there discernible bases for distinguishing among these
three kinds of receipts with reference to an articulated scale of
commonly accepted social values?
To the extent that we have a commonly held judgment as to
the worth of the employment relationship to our society it would
seem to involve such notions as these: (a) We depend upon hu-
man labor for most of what we enjoy and accomplish. (b) Labor
is therefore both a necessary and commendable activity. (c) Be-
cause of the accelerated pace of industrial concentration and the
apparent desire for security, working for someone else as opposed
to self-employment seems increasingly to be both necessary and
desirable.
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Although it is true that most people would as well concede that
the making of grants to students and scholars is an activity of
great value to our society, it seems clear that both the reasons for
such an opinion and the intensity with which it is held are differ-
ent from the social judgment concerning employment. Here feel-
ings such as these are involved: (a) Our survival as a nation
depends to a great extent on the supply of scientists, teachers and
similarly occupied persons and upon the quality of their training.
(b) To a degree the activities of such persons have an intrinsic
worth greater than that of activities directed toward the produc-
tion of wealth. (c) The preoccupation with physical comfort and
enjoyment which seems to be typical of our major efforts and
which negates to a degree our judgment as to the worth of schol-
arship and research concerns us.
A consideration of the role of gifts is more difficult. It is not so
much that we value the act of making a gift (other than the
making of charitable gifts) as that gift giving exemplifies a
major value judgment: The desirability of the unrestricted use
and enjoyment of one's own property. In any event, it seems that
such a judgment is different in kind from that held with regard
to the payment of compensation and is supplementary to that held
as to the making of grants. By and large then, the characteristics
of each type of receipt in most of the categories depicted is essen-
tially dissimilar except as one includes charitable contributions in
the category of "gifts. '42 Therefore, at the very least, one can
42. The chart following depicts graphically the extent of dissimilarity ex-
pounded in the text. Similarities are indicated by the use of common letters.
Double letters indicate approximate similarity.
COMPENSATION SCHOLARSHIP & GIFT
I FELLOWSHIP I
1. Motive of Payor A B j C
2. Relationship between payor D I
and recipient E F
3. Primary economics function G H I
of relationship between
payor & recipient
4. Payors:
a. economic status J K K
b. family status - L
c. ind. or corp. - 1
5. Recipients
a. economic status - N NN
b. family status - -
c. ind. or corp. 0 0 P
6. Relationship of payment - Q Q Q
to need of recipi entI
7. Commonly accepted social R S 5 ] T
value judgment I 
On the use of such charts in legal articles, see Horwitz and Netterville, Un-
privileged Refusal To Reap Where One Has Not Sown, 12 J. Legal Ed. 201
(1959).
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conclude that there is little that compels a reference to the word
"gift" in an income tax definition of grant and even less that com-
pels a reference to the term "compensation."
This is not to say that there is no problem with payments which
are mislabeled, whether intentionally or otherwise. But in making
a determination whether a particular payment is in fact what it
purports to be one should look to see if there are present those
elements of motive (e.g., desire to encourage worth-while scien-
tific scholarship), relationship (e.g., absence of consanguinity),
need of the recipient (e.g., in the case of most students, a substan-
tial factor), etc. which are most often typical of grants, rather
than to ask whether there are elements present which are also
often present in situations of "gift" or "compensation."
One should note finally that of major significance in this prob-
lem of differentiation is the institutionalized framework which
typifies the administration of scholarships and grants. It is by the
universities and charitable foundations that most grants are ad-
ministered. This is a significant distinction from the framework
which surrounds the payment of compensation and the making of
gifts. Although this approach to the problem of differentiation
may at its essence involve only a difference in emphasis rather
than a difference in kind from what has been criticized as the
present attitude of the Treasury, it would go far to resolve the
ambiguity which now seems to distort the Treasury's view. The
position which this paper supports would not distinguish between
the intern43 and the National Health Institute award recipient ;44
nor would it distinguish the professor on sabbatical leave from
the other twoA5 In all three cases the essential and fundamental
characteristics of grants are found to be present.
III. THE RELEVANCE OF THE EXPENSE DEDUCTION OF STUDENT
AND SCHOLAR TO SECTION 117
One difficulty with the separation of grants from compensation in
the income tax law is raised by the possible significance of the de-
ductibility of certain expenses to the scholar and student.46
Suppose a teacher of English history travels abroad during a school
vacation period to examine and collect materials related to a research
project in his field. In order to support a claimed deduction for his
expenses on the trip, the taxpayer must contend not only that the
expenses were reasonable in amount but also that they were incurred
in the "conduct of his business and directly attributable to it.''47 The
important word is "business." Is research a teacher's business? An
affirmative answer may be thought to involve the consequence that
for purposes of section 177 also research is business. If so, the divorce-
43. Supra note 33.
44. Supra note 31.
45. Supra note 32.
46. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162.
47. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a) (1958).
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ment for grants from compensation-like income in the case of the pro-
fessional scholar would seem to become more difficult than has been
indicated heretofore.
The Regulation dealing with the "Expenses of Education" also be-
comes important. 8 It states:
Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are deductible
if they are for education (including research activities) under-
taken primarily for the purpose of:
(1) Maintaining or improving skills required by the taxpayer
in his employment or other trade or business, or(2) Meeting the express requirements of a taxpayer's em-
ployer, or the requirements of applicable law or regulations,
imposed as a condition to the retention by the taxpayer of his
salary, status or employment.
In many academic institutions research activity is indeed expected
of the teacher49 although the exact significance of accomplishment or
failure in this regard is not generally made explicit. But if our Eng-
lish teacher contends that his travel expenses are "directly attributa-
ble" to his profession is he not, at least by implication, stating that to
engage in research is to engage in effort closely associated with the
retention of his position as a teacher? And if so is this not most ma-
terial to the argument made under section 117? If research is the
teacher's business, the argument would run, the grant made to him for
conducting that activity is almost indistinguishable from compensa-
tion. But is this so compelling as it might seem?
In general for the purpose of finding a grant to be compensation one
would expect to find (a) that the grantor received some benefit or (b)
that the recipient was, in some sense, in an employment relationship
to the grantor. On the other hand, to support a deduction for a busi-
ness expense one need find only the existence of a trade and the neces-
sary relationship of the expense to it, one need not also show an em-
ployment relationship nor a benefit to some other person. Thus, our
English teacher may well qualify his expenses for a business deduction
without conceding that a Ford Foundation grant he might receive the
following year for further study is compensation. For, although he is
engaged in a business while engaged in research, he is not an employee
in using Ford Foundation funds to aid him in the furtherance of that
business.
48. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (a) (1958).
49. If it is true that the primary obligation imposed upon the teacher by his
employment is the teaching of students, one may wonder why so much emphasis
is placed upon research and publication as criteria of eligibility for promotion.
One explanation is that the classroom performance of a teacher provides little or
no opportunity for the formation of judgments concerning his competence by those
responsible for passing such judgments; and on the other hand publications do
afford that opportunity.
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Suppose, however, in the last example the grant was received from
the university by which the professor is regularly employed rather
than from the Ford Foundation. Would the existence of the employ-
ment relation between grantor and recipient alter the conclusion under
section 117? Now both business and employer-employee relationship
are present. On the other hand, in our example, the research activity
takes place during a period when the teacher would not ordinarily be
engaged in teaching activity. One Field Office ° of the Internal Rev-
enue Service has ruled that in a case such as this the juxtaposition of
business and employment takes the case out of section 117.
Two observations may be made with respect to this rather special
situation. First, for what reason should the grant be includible as
compensation merely because it was received from the employing in-
stitution rather than the Ford Foundation? If all the other criteria
concerning the characteristics of grants as differentiated from com-
pensation are otherwise satisfied, why should the existence of a simi-
larity in one category, that of the relationship of grantor and grantee,
be conclusive? Second, section 117 itself establishes a standard which
refers to the identity of the grantor. This standard does not, however,
turn on the relationship of grantor to grantee but rather upon the
nature of the grantor as a non-profit organization. A fair implication
seems to be that Congress did not mean to exclude such a payment
from the section of exclusion merely because the grant was made by
an employer. Revenue Ruling 58-17951 supports this conclusion. It
should be noted, however, that Revenue Ruling 58-22252 is apparently
to the contrary.
IV. CONCLUSION
Section 117, enacted to resolve problems of prior case law in respect
to the income tax treatment of scholarship and fellowship grants,
affords a reasonable basis for the solution of these problems. The
Treasury in its interpretation of the section has not thus far utilized
its opportunity because it has failed to change its outlook on the nature
of these problems. It has continued to make its chief reference the
polar terms "compensation" and "gift" rather than the essentially
unique function and characteristics of scholarships and fellowships
themselves. A change in this outlook is impelled by the existence of
section 117 and by the nature of these grants. Such a change should
take the form of a recognition of the function of these kinds of pay-
ments and the way in which they are administered. An approach to
the old problems in such a new light offers the most reasonable oppor-
tunity for their resolution.
50. Detroit, Michigan.
51. 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 57.
52. 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 54.
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